U.S. President Donald Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs”, that go into effect this week, could have a “devastating impact” on global trade, and even lead to the collapse of some national economies, warns Asia Society president and CEO Kyung-wha Kang. In this interview with The Hindu during a recent visit to India, Ms. Kang — who was South Korea’s first female Foreign Minister (2017-2021), and previously held a number of senior positions in the United Nations on Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights — analyses Mr. Trump’s moves on geopolitics, Gaza, and Ukraine as an even bigger threat for the existing global order. Excerpts:
What will be the impact of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs”?
If the reciprocal tariffs he has threatened across the board, around the world, for all countries are implemented as is expected, I think they will have a dampening effect on global trade. You could reach a level in different trade zones where the trade itself completely collapses, and that means certain national economies could collapse. For countries like South Korea, where we have no natural resources, our economy is completely dependent upon export-driven growth. So hopefully there is room in that announcement that creates exceptions or creates room for discussions. If not, it will be devastating, and will almost stop the global trading system as we know it.
Could China gain from this move?
Well, I think everybody loses in this, at first impact. But China is a big economy and China has been, for many years, looking at what is coming out of the United States, and tried to build its own domestic capacity. It has also tried to prepare itself for decoupling by increasing self-sufficiency. Of course, currently the Chinese economy is not doing all that well: consumer confidence has dropped during the COVID lockdowns and never picked up again, the property market has crashed, etc. If anything, what has done well there is innovation — companies like Deepseek (AI) and Huawei (Technology and EVs) have survived and excelled against all odds.
This has been hailed as the Asian century. Twenty-five years into it, what is your prediction for the rest of it?
This is still a century of Asia’s rise, of global affairs moving surely but gradually towards Asia. But that process has been quite a disruptive one, and when existing orders are changing, there is a disruptive element always to that. Of course, the final moment of this quarter-century has been particularly disruptive, with President Trump coming back to the leadership position of the United States. I think the past two months have seen such a flurry of initiatives coming up from the White House, both on the economic front, and the most surprising part, of initiatives on the geopolitical, on the peace and security front. The world is at a turning point, entering a new kind of a geopolitical order that is much more multipolar. And I think that in this unfolding Asian century, the bilateral relationship between China and India will have a particularly definitive part to play in the century, going forward.
At a recent event with you, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar referred to Mr. Trump’s moves as a “paradigm shift” for the US. How much of it was unexpected, and is it irreversible now?
I think the tariff agenda of the new U.S. administration could be expected, because ‘tariffs’ are the “most beautiful word in the world” according to President Trump, even though the intensity of his announcements are surprising. What is more surprising is his approach to the current geopolitical conflict challenges in Gaza and in Ukraine. In Ukraine, putting the aggressor and the victim on the same plane, and trying to negotiate a peace out of that might have some results in the short term, but in the long term, they are forcing other NATO countries to completely reimagine their own security calculations.
What does this mean for U.S. policy towards Taiwan, towards the protection of the Taiwan Straits in the event of conflict with China?
I think certainly there are China hawks in the new administration that are prepared for any eventuality across the Straits. China certainly also is building up its military muscle, increasingly aggressive in its drills around Taiwan. The sense is that President Trump himself is more of a deal maker than a warmonger, and therefore all the pressure that he’s putting on China, it would seem, is aimed at some kind of a big deal with China.
What should countries who have been part of U.S. mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific — like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and India — be planning for?
Well, alliance partners like Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and Philippines will certainly come together. I think that that is natural, that is human nature. When you, suddenly, you’re faced with this big security deficit, there’s a tendency to rally around like-minded neighbours. But the countries of this region are too diverse, with different security risk calculations, for a NATO-type formation to emerge. For example, for South Korea, it’s really North Korea that is the security challenge. And its whole defence architecture, the deterrence, has been built to counter the threat coming from North Korea.
Given the years you have worked in the UN system, is it time for these countries to discuss a new world order mechanism?
Aiming for a new world order simply by the agencies of the middle powers alone is too much of a stretch. But I do think that it’s in their own interest for middle powers to play a constructive role, where, as Minister Jaishankar said, contestations don’t become conflicts. So they can play a diplomatic role, boost intense engagement to manage conflict dynamics from getting out of control and creating room for a peace dynamic in the new era.
Published – April 06, 2025 10:14 pm IST